Relationship-based access control (ReBAC) provides a high level of expressiveness and exibility that promotes security and information sharing. We formulate ReBAC as an object-oriented extension of a ribute-based access control (ABAC) in which relationships are expressed using elds that refer to other objects, and path expressions are used to follow chains of relationships between objects.
INTRODUCTION
e term relationship-based access control (ReBAC) was introduced to describe access control policies expressed in terms of interpersonal relationships in social network systems (SNSs). e underlying principle of expressing access control policies in terms of chains of relationships between entities is equally applicable and bene cial in general computing systems: it increases expressiveness and o en allows more natural policies. is paper presents ORAL (Objectoriented Relationship-based Access-control Language), a ReBAC language formulated as an object-oriented extension of ABAC. Relationships are expressed using a ributes that refer to other objects, including subjects and resources, and path expressions are used to follow chains of relationships between objects. In ORAL, a ReBAC policy consists of a class model, an object model, and access control rules. Section 6 compares ORAL with previous ReBAC models. is material is based on work supported in part by NSF Grants CNS-1421893, and CCF-1414078, ONR Grant N00014-15-1-2208, AFOSR Grant FA9550-14-1-0261, and DARPA Contract FA8650-15-C-7561. Any opinions, ndings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the authors and do not necessarily re ect the views of these agencies. Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for pro t or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the rst page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permi ed. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior speci c permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from permissions@acm.org. SACMAT '17, Indianapolis, IN, USA © 2017 ACM. 978-1-4503-4702-0/17/06. . . $15.00 DOI: h p://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3078861.3078878 e cost of manually developing an initial high-level policy is a barrier to adoption of high-level policy models. Policy mining algorithms promise to drastically reduce this cost, by partially automating the process.
ere is a signi cant amount of research on role mining and some recent research on ABAC policy mining [11, [13] [14] [15] . ere is no prior work on mining of ReBAC policies (or object-oriented ABAC policies with path expressions).
is paper de nes the ReBAC policy mining problem and presents the rst algorithm for mining ReBAC policies from ACLs and attribute data represented as object models. It is easy to show that the problem is NP-hard, based on the Xu and Stoller's proof that ABAC policy mining is NP-hard [15] . Since we desire an e cient and practical algorithm, our algorithm incorporates greedy heuristics and is not guaranteed to generate an optimal policy. Our algorithm has three phases. In the rst phase, it iterates over tuples in the subject-permission relation, uses selected tuples as seeds for constructing candidate rules, and a empts to generalize each candidate rule to cover additional tuples in the subject-permission relation by replacing conditions on user a ributes or resource a ributes with constraints that relate user a ributes with resource a ributes. e algorithm greedily selects the highest-quality generalization according to a rule quality metric based primarily on the ratio of the number of previously uncovered subject-permission tuples covered by the rule to the rule's WSC. e rst phase ends when the set of candidate rules covers the entire subject-permission relation. e second phase a empts to improve the policy by merging and simplifying candidate rules. e third phase selects the highest-quality candidate rules for inclusion in the mined policy. is high-level algorithm structure is based on Xu and Stoller's algorithm for mining ABAC policies from ACLs [15] , but there are also many di erences between the algorithms, as discussed in detail in Section 6.
Our algorithm can be adapted to mine ReBAC policies from access logs and object models, in a similar way as Xu and Stoller's algorithm [15] was adapted to mine ABAC policies from access logs and a ribute data [13] .
We evaluate our algorithm on four relatively small but non-trivial sample policies and on two much larger and more complex case studies developed by Decat, Bogaerts, Lagaisse, and Joosen based on the access control requirements for So ware-as-a-Service (SaaS) applications o ered real companies [7, 8] . We translate Decat et al.'s detailed natural-language descriptions of the policies into class models and ReBAC rules, omi ing a few aspects le for future work, mainly temporal conditions, obligations, and policy administration. To the best of our knowledge, these two case studies are the largest rule-based policies (as measured by the number and complexity of the rules) on which any policy mining algorithm has been evaluated.
Our evaluation methodology is to start with a ReBAC policy, generate ACLs representing the subject-permission relation, run our algorithm, and compare the ReBAC policy mined from ACLs with the original ReBAC policy. For the four sample policies, the mined policy is identical to the original policy, except for one minor syntactic variation in one conjunct of one condition of one rule of one sample policy (the variant is semantically equivalent to and equally simple as the original conjunct). For the e-document case study, our algorithm achieves roughly 80% to 90% similarity between the original and mined policies, depending on details of the comparison metric. For the workforce management case study, the mined policy is simpler than the original policy, and our algorithm achieves roughly 70% to 90% similarity between the original and mined policies, depending on the metric.
POLICY LANGUAGE
is section presents our policy language, ORAL. It contains common ABAC constructs, similar to those in [15] , plus path expressions.
A ReBAC policy is a tuple π = CM, OM, Act, Rules , where CM is a class model, OM is an object model, Act is a set of actions, and Rules is a set of rules.
A class model is a set of class declarations. A class declaration is a tuple className, parent, elds where parent is a class name or the empty string (indicating that the class does not have a parent), and elds is a set of eld declarations. A eld declaration is a tuple eldName, type, multiplicity , where type is a class name or Boolean, and multiplicity is optional, one, or many. e multiplicity speci es how many values of the speci ed type may be stored in the eld and is "one" (also denoted "1", meaning exactly one), "optional" (also denoted "?", meaning zero or one), or "many" (also denoted "*", meaning any natural number). Boolean elds always have multiplicity 1. Every class implicitly contains a eld "id" with type String. We keep the language minimal by not allowing user-de ned elds with type string. However, their e ect can be achieved using a eld that refers to an object having the desired string as its id. us, the set of types in a policy contains Boolean, String, and the names of the declared classes. A reference type is any class name (used as a type).
An object model is a set of objects whose types are consistent with the class model and with unique values in the "id's . An object is a tuple className, eldVals , where eldVals is a function that maps the names of elds of the speci ed class, including the id eld and inherited elds, to values consistent with the types and multiplicities of the elds. e value of a eld with multiplicity many is a set. e value of a eld with multiplicity one or optional is a single value; the special placeholder ⊥ is used when a eld with multiplicity optional lacks an actual value. For an object o = c, f , let type(o) = c and fVal(o) = f .
A condition is a set, interpreted as a conjunction, of atomic conditions. We o en refer to the atomic conditions as conjuncts. Informally, an atomic condition is a condition on the value of one eld of one object. An atomic condition is a tuple p, op, val , where p is a non-empty path, op is an operator, either "in" or "contains", and val is a constant value, either an atomic value or a set of atomic values. Note that val cannot equal or contain the placeholder ⊥. A path is a sequence of eld names. In examples, we usually write conditions with a logic-based syntax, for readability, using "∈" for "in" and " " for "contains". For example, we may write dept.id, in, {CompSci} as dept.id ∈ {CompSci}. We may use "=" as syntactic sugar for "in" when the constant is a singleton set; thus, the previous example may be wri en as dept.id=CompSci. Note that a condition may contain multiple atomic conditions on the same path.
A constraint is a set, interpreted as a conjunction, of atomic constraints. Informally, an atomic constraint expresses a relationship between the value of one eld of one object (the subject issuing the request) and the value of one eld of another object (the requested resource). An atomic constraint is a tuple p 1 , op, p 2 , where p 1 and p 2 are paths (possibly the empty sequence), and op is one of the following four operators: equal, in, contains, supseteq. e "contains" operator is the transpose of the "in" operator. Implicitly, the rst path is relative to the requesting subject, and the second path is relative to the requested resource. e empty path represents the subject or resource itself. In examples, we usually write constraints with a logic-based syntax, for readability, using "=" for "equal" and "⊇" for "supseteq", and we pre x the subject path p 1 and resource path p 2 with "subject" and "resource", respectively. For example, specialties, contains, topic may be wri en as subject.specialties resource.topic. Other relational operators, such as ⊆, could also be added; we omit them for now, since they are not needed for our case studies.
A rule is a tuple subjectType, subjectCondition, resourceType, resourceCondition, constraint, actions , where subjectType and re-sourceType are class names, subjectCondition and resourceCondition are conditions, constraint is a constraint, actions is a set of actions, and the following well-formedness requirements are satis ed. Implicitly, the paths in subjectCondition and resourceCondition are relative to the requesting subject and requested resource, respectively. e type of a path p (relative to a speci ed class), denoted type(p), is the type of the last eld in the path. e multiplicity of a path p (relative to a speci ed class), denoted multiplicity(p), is one if all elds on the path have multiplicity one, is many if any eld on the path has multiplicity many, and is optional otherwise.
Well-formedness requirements on rules are as follows. (1) All paths are type-correct, assuming the subject and resource have type subjectType and resourceType, respectively. (2) (a) e two paths in the constraint have the same type, and (b) this type is not String. Part (a) re ects the assumption that comparing objects of di erent types is either meaningless or useless (since it would be equivalent to "false"). Part (b) prohibits constraints that compare identi ers of objects with di erent types, which would be meaningless. It does not reduce the expressiveness of the model, because a constraint violating it, such as specialties.id topic.id, can be wri en more simply as specialties topic. (3) e path in the condition does not have reference type. is re ects the fact that our language does not allow constants with reference type. (4) In conditions with operator "in", the path has multiplicity optional or one, and the constant is a set. is excludes sets of sets from the model. (5) In conditions with operator "contains", the path has multiplicity many, and the constant is an atomic value. (6) In constraints with operator "equal", both paths have multiplicity optional or one. (7) In constraints with operator "in", the rst path has multiplicity optional or one, and the second path has multiplicity many. (8) In constraints with operator "contains", the rst path has multiplicity many, and the second path has multiplicity optional or one. (9) In constraints with operator "supseteq", both paths have multiplicity many.
In examples, we pre x the path in the subject condition and resource condition with "subject" and "resource", respectively, for readability. For example, our project management policy contains the rule: A contractor working on a project can read and request to work on a non-proprietary task of the project whose required areas of expertise are among his/her areas of expertise. is is expressed as Contractor, true, Task, resource.isProprietary=false, subject.projects resource.project ∧ subject.expertise ⊇ resource.expertise, {read, request} .
For a rule ρ = st, sc, rt, rc, c, A , let sType(ρ) = st, sCond(ρ) = sc, rType(ρ) = rt, rCond(ρ) = rc, con(ρ) = c, and acts(ρ) = A.
An subject-permission tuple is a tuple s, r , a , where s and r are objects, and a is an action. is tuple means that subject s is permi ed to perform action a on resource r . A subject-permission relation is a set of such tuples.
Given an class model, object model, object o, and path p, let nav(o, p) be the result of navigating (a.k.a. following or dereferencing) path p starting from object o. e class model and object model are implicit arguments to this relation and the following relations. We elide these arguments, because in our se ing, they are unchanging in the context of a given policy, so making them explicit arguments would just add clu er. e result might be no value, represented by ⊥, an atomic value, or a set. A set may be obtained if any eld along the path (not necessarily the last eld) has multiplicity many. is is like the semantics of path navigation in UML's Object Constraint Language (OCL) (h p://www.omg.org/spec/OCL/). An object o satis es an atomic condition Objects o 1 and o 2 satisfy an atomic constraint c = p 1 , op,
A subject-permission tuple s, r , a satis es a rule ρ = st, sc, rt,
e meaning of a ReBAC policy π , denoted [[π ]], is the subjectpermission relation it induces, de ned as the union of the meanings of its rules.
PROBLEM DEFINITION
An access control list (ACL) policy is a tuple CM, OM, Act, SP 0 , where CM is a class model, OM is an object model, Act is a set of actions, and SP 0 ⊆ OM × OM × Act is a subject-permission relation. Conceptually, SP 0 is the union of the resources' access control lists.
An ReBAC policy π is consistent with an ACL policy CM, OM, Act, SP 0 if they have the same class model, object model, and actions and [[π ]] = SP 0 .
An ReBAC policy consistent with a given ACL policy can be trivially constructed, by creating a separate rule corresponding to each subject-permission tuple in the ACL policy, using a condition "id=…" to identify the relevant subject and resource. Of course, such a ReBAC policy is as verbose and hard to manage as the original ACL policy. erefore, we must decide: among ReBAC policies consistent with a given ACL policy π 0 , which ones are preferable? We adopt two criteria.
One criterion is that the "id' eld should be avoided when possible, because policies that use this eld are (to that extent) identitybased, not a ribute-based or relationship-based. erefore, our de nition of ReBAC policy mining requires that these a ributes are used only when necessary, i.e., only when every ReBAC policy consistent with π 0 contains rules that use them. e other criterion is to maximize a policy quality metric. A policy quality metric is a function Q pol from ReBAC policies to a totally-ordered set, such as the natural numbers. e ordering is chosen so that small values indicate high quality; this is natural for metrics based on policy size. For generality, we parameterize the policy mining problem by the policy quality metric.
e ReBAC policy mining problem is: given an ACL policy π 0 = CM, OM, Act, SP 0 and a policy quality metric Q pol , nd a set Rules of rules such that the ReBAC policy π = CM, OM, Act, Rules is consistent with π 0 , uses the "id" eld only when necessary, and has the best quality, according to Q pol , among such policies.
e policy quality metric that our algorithm aims to optimize is weighted structural complexity (WSC), a generalization of policy size rst introduced for RBAC policies [12] and later extended to ABAC [15] . Minimizing policy size is consistent with prior work on ABAC mining and role mining and with usability studies showing that more concise access control policies are more manageable [1] . Informally, the WSC of a ReBAC policy is a weighted sum of the numbers of elements of each kind in the policy. Formally, the WSC of a ReBAC policy π , denoted WSC(π ), is the sum of the WSC of its rules, de ned bo om-up as follows.
e WSC of an atomic condition p, op, val is |p| + |val|, where |p| is the length of path p, and |val| is 1 if val is an atomic value and is the cardinality of val if val is a set. e WSC of an atomic constraint p 1 , op, p 2 is |p 1 |+|p 2 |. e WSC of a condition c, denoted WSC cndn (c), is the sum of the WSC of the constituent atomic conditions. e WSC of a constraint c, denoted WSC cnst (c), is the sum of the WSC of the constituent atomic constraints. e WSC of a rule is WSC( st, sc, rt, rc, c, A ) = w 1 WSC cndn (sc) + w 1 WSC cndn (rc) + w 2 WSC cnst (c) + w 3 |A|, where |A| is the cardinality of set A, and the w i are user-speci ed weights.
ALGORITHM
is section presents our algorithm. It is based on the ABAC policy mining algorithm in [15] . e main di erences are summarized in Section 6.
Top-level pseudocode appears in Figure 1 . It re ects the highlevel structure described in Section 1. We refer to the tuples selected in the rst statement of the rst while loop as seeds. e top-level pseudocode is explained by embedded comments. It calls several functions, described next. Function names hyperlink to pseudocode for the function, if it is included in the paper, otherwise to the description of the function. Figure 1 is a priority queue sorted in descending lexicographic order by the quality Q sp of the subjectpermission tuple. Informally, Q sp ( s, r , a ) is a triple whose rst two components are the frequency of permission r, a and subject s, respectively, i.e., their numbers of occurrences in SP 0 , and whose third component (included as a tie-breaker to ensure a total order) is the string representation of the tuple. function candidateConstraint(s, r ) // cc is the set of type-correct candidate constraints cc = ∅ for T in (reach(type(s)) ∩ reach(type(r ))) // add candidate constraints where the paths have type T for p 1 in paths(type(s),T ) for p 2 in paths(type(r ),T ) cc.add( p 1 , opFromMul(multiplicity(p 1 ), multiplicity(p 2 )), p 2 ) end for end for end for return {c ∈ cc | s, r |= c} Figure 2 returns a set containing all the atomic constraints that hold between resource r and subject s. It rst computes a set cc of candidate constraints using type-correct shortest paths to each type T reachable from both type(s) and type(r ) in the graph graph(CM), which has a vertex for each class, and an edge from c 1 to c 2 if c 1 has a eld with type c 2 . It then selects and returns the candidate constraints satis ed by s, r .
is algorithm infers only constraints where the paths have reference types. It could easily be extended to infer constraints where the paths have type Boolean, but such constraints do not arise in our current case studies. It uses the following auxiliary functions. reach(T ) returns the set of classes reachable from T in graph(CM), including their superclasses. function paths(T ,T ) returns the set of shortest paths from T to T in graph(CM). function opFromMul(m, m ) returns the relational operator suitable for le and right operands with multiplicity m and m , respectively, de ned by the following case statement on m, m : many, many ⇒ supseteq | many, ⇒ contains | , many ⇒ in | , ⇒ equal. We extend this function to also produce non-shortest paths. ese extensions are not re ected in the pseudo-code. Specically, we extend paths(T ,T ) to return paths with length at most dist(T ,T ) + SPED and dist(T ,T ) + RPED when T = type(s) and T = type(r ), respectively, where dist(T ,T ) is the length of shortest paths from T to T in graph(CM), and SPED (mnemonic for "subject path extra distance") and RPED (mnemonic for "resource path extra distance") are parameters of the algorithm. In order to limit the overall complexity of a candidate constraint, we also introduce a parameter MTPL (mnemonic for "maximum total path length") that limits the sum of the path lengths in a constraint; speci cally, in the inner loop, a candidate constraint is constructed only if |p 1 | + |p 2 | ≤ MTPL. e function addCandidateRule(st, s s , rt, s r , cc, s a , uncovSP, Rules) in Figure 3 calls computeCondition to compute conditions sc and rc that characterizes s s and s r , respectively. MSPL and MRPL are the maximum path length for paths in the subject condition and resource condition, respectively; they are parameters of the algorithm. addCandidateRule then constructs a rule ρ = st, sc, rt, rc, ∅, s a , calls generalizeRule to generalize ρ to ρ and adds ρ to candidate First, paths not containing the id eld are considered. If the resulting condition does not characterize O, then (by construction) it is an over-approximation, and a conjunct using the "id" eld is added to ensure that the resulting condition characterizes O. e condition returned by computeCondition might not be minimum-sized among conditions that characterize O: possibly some conjuncts can be deleted without changing the condition's meaning. We defer minimization of the condition until a er the call to generalizeRule (described below), because minimizing the condition before that would reduce opportunities to nd constraints in generalizeRule.
A rule ρ is valid if [[ρ ]] ⊆ SP 0 . e function generalizeRule(ρ, cc, uncovSP, Rules) a empts to generalize rule ρ by adding some of the atomic constraints in cc to ρ and eliminating the conjuncts of the subject condition and resource condition that use the same paths as those constraints. A rule obtained in this way is called a generalization of ρ. It is more general in the sense that it refers to relationships instead of speci c values. e meaning of a generalization of ρ is a superset of the meaning of ρ. In more detail, generalizeRule sorts cc in the order described below, tries to add the constraints in every subsequence of cc to ρ, and if any of the resulting generalized rules is valid, it returns the highest-quality rule among them according to the rule quality metric described below, otherwise it returns ρ. When trying to add a constraint c in cc to a rule ρ, generalizeRule rst tries removing the conjuncts of the subject condition and resource condition that use the same paths as c. If the resulting rule is invalid, it a empts a more conservative generalization by removing only the conjunct in the subject condition that uses the same path as c.
If that rule is also invalid, it instead removes only the conjunct in the resource condition that uses the same path as c. If that rule is also valid, then there is no valid generalization of ρ using c.
generalizeRule sorts cc because the order in which candidate constraints are considered can a ect the resulting generalized rule. For example, suppose adding candidate constraint c 1 keeps the rule valid and removes a conjunct in the subject condition, and that adding candidate constraint c 2 removes a conjunct in the subject condition and a conjunct in the resource condition, and yields a higher-quality resulting rule if the resulting rule is valid. Suppose, further, that adding c 2 keeps the rule valid only if c 1 has already been added. In this case, the highest-quality generalization will be created only if c 1 is considered before c 2 . To sort cc, we temporarily add each constraint c in cc to ρ (in the same way as described above) and, if this leads to a valid generalization of ρ, compute the number of subject-permission tuples in uncovSP covered by the resulting rule, and then sort cc in descending order by these values. If adding c does not lead to a valid generalization of ρ, c is useless and can be removed from cc.
A rule quality metric is a function Q rul (ρ, SP) that maps a rule ρ to a totally-ordered set, with the order chosen such that larger values indicate higher quality. e second argument SP is a set of subjectpermission tuples. Based on our primary goal of minimizing the mined policy's WSC, a secondary preference for rules with more constraints, and a tertiary preference for rules with shorter paths in constraints, we de ne
where TCPL(ρ) ("total constraint path length") is the sum of the lengths of the paths used in the constraints of ρ.
e preference for more constraints is a heuristic, based on the observation that rules with more constraints tend to be more general than other rules with the same | [[ρ]] ∩ SP |/WSC(ρ) (such rules typically have more conjuncts) and hence lead to lower WSC for the policy. In generalizeRule, uncovSP is the second argument to Q rul , so [[ρ]] ∩ SP is the set of subject-permission tuples in SP 0 that are covered by ρ and not covered by existing rules. e function mergeRulesLUB(Rules) a empts to improve the quality of Rules by merging pairs of rules that have the same subject type, resource type, and constraint by taking the least upper bound of their subject conditions, the least upper bound of their resource conditions, and the union of their sets of actions. e least upper bound of conditions c 1 and c 2 , denoted c 1 c 2 , is
Note that the meaning of the merged rule ρ mrg is a superset of the meanings of the rules ρ 1 and ρ 2 being merged. If the merged rule ρ mrg is valid, then it replaces ρ 1 and ρ 2 in Rules. mergeRulesLUB(Rules) updates its argument Rules in place, and it returns a Boolean indicating whether any rules were merged. e function simplifyRules(Rules) a empts to simplify all of the rules in Rules. It updates its argument Rules in place, replacing rules in Rules with simpli ed versions when simpli cation succeeds. It returns a Boolean indicating whether any rules were simpli ed. It a empts to simplify each rule in the following ways.
(1) It eliminates conjuncts from the subject and resource conditions when this preserves validity. Since removing one conjunct might prevent removal of another conjunct, it searches for a set of conjuncts that maximizes the quality of the resulting rule. To limit the cost, we introduce a parameter MCSE (mnemonic for "maximum conjuncts to simplify exhaustively"). If the number of conjuncts is at most MCSE, the algorithm tries removing every subset of conjuncts. If the number of conjuncts exceeds MCSE, the algorithm sorts the conjuncts in descending lexicographic order by Q ac (quality metric for atomic conditions) and then a empts to remove them linearly in the sorted order, where Q ac ( p, op, val ) = |val|, |p|, isId(p), toString(p) , where |val| is 1 if val is an atomic value and is the cardinality if val is a set, and isId(p) is 1 if p is "id" and is 0 otherwise. e last component of Q ac is included as a tie-breaker to ensure a total order. (2) It eliminates atomic constraints when this preserves validity. It searches for the set of atomic constraints to remove that maximizes the quality of the resulting rule, while preserving validity. (3) It eliminates overlapping actions between rules. Speci cally, an action a in a rule ρ is removed if there is another rule ρ in the policy such that sCond(ρ ) ⊆ sCond(ρ) ∧ rCond(ρ ) ⊆ rCond(ρ) ∧ con(ρ ) ⊆ con(ρ) ∧ a ∈ acts(ρ ). (4) It eliminates actions when this preserves the meaning of the policy. In other words, it removes an action a in rule ρ if all the subject-permission tuple covered by a in ρ are covered by other rules in the policy. Note that (3) is a special case of (4), listed separately to ensure that this special case takes precedence.
e function mergeRulesInheritance(Rules) a empts to merge a set of rules if their subject types or resource types have a common superclass and all the other components of the rule are the same. In this case, it replaces that set of rules with a single rule whose subject type or resource type is the most general superclass for which the merged rule is valid. For example, rules st 1 , sc, rt, rc, c, A and st 2 , sc, rt, rc, c, A are replaced with ρ mrg = st , sc, rt, rc, c, A if ρ mrg is valid, and st is a superclass of st 1 and st 2 , and these conditions do not hold for any superclass of st .
Sample Policies and Case Studies
We developed six ReBAC policies: four sample policies, which have non-trivial and realistic rules, but are smaller and not directly based on the policy of a particular organization, and two large case studies, based on the policies of real (but anonymous) companies, as described by Decat et al. [7, 8] . Each policy has handwri en class model and rules, and a pseudorandom synthetic object model generated by a policy-speci c algorithm. Each object model generation algorithm is parameterized by a size parameter N .
e Electronic Medical Record (EMR) sample policy, based on the EBAC policy in [2] , controls access by physicians and patients to electronic medical records. e numbers of physicians, patients, medical records, and hospitals are proportional to N . A sample rule is "A physician at a facility can view a medical record for a consultation with any physician at that facility by a patient still registered at the facility", expressed as Physician, true, MedicalRecord, true, subject.a liation = resource.consultation.physician.a liation ∧ subject.a liation ∈ resource.consultation.patient.registrations, {view} .
e healthcare sample policy, based on the ABAC policy in [15] , controls access by nurses, doctors, patients, and agents (e.g., a patient's spouse) to electronic health records (HRs) and HR items (i.e., entries in health records). e numbers of wards, teams, doctors, nurses, teams, patients, and agents are proportional to N . A sample rule is "A doctor can read an item in a HR for a patient treated by one of the teams of which he/she is a member, if the topics of the item are among his/her specialties", expressed as Doctor, true, HealthRecordItem, true, subject.teams contains resource.record.patient.treatingTeam ∧ subject.specialties ⊇ resource.topics, {read} , where HealthRecordItem.record is the health record containing the HR item. e project management sample policy, based on the ABAC policy in [15] , controls access by department managers, project leaders, employees, contractors, auditors, accountants, and planners to budgets, schedules, and tasks associated with projects. e numbers of departments, projects, tasks, and users of each type are proportional to N . A sample rule appears in Section 2.
e university sample policy, based on the ABAC policy in [15] , controls access by students, instructors, teaching assistants (TAs), department chairs, and sta in the registrar's o ce and admissions o ce to applications (for admission), gradebooks, transcripts, and course schedules. e numbers of departments, students, faculty, and applicants for admission are proportional to N .
e e-document case study, based on [7] , is for a SaaS multitenant e-document processing application. e application allows tenants to distribute documents to their customers, either digitally or physically (by printing them and employing postal mail). e overall policy contains rules governing document access and administrative operations by employees of the e-document company, such as helpdesk operators and application administrators. It also contains speci c policies for some sample tenants. e numbers of employees of each tenant, registered users of each customer organization, and documents are proportional to N . e workforce management case study, based on [8] , is for a SaaS workforce management application provided by a company called eWorkforce which handles the work ow planning and supply management for product or service appointments (e.g., install or repair jobs). Tenants (i.e., eWorkforce customers) can create tasks on behalf of their customers. Technicians working for eWorkforce, one of its workforce suppliers, or one of the subcontractors of one of the workforce supplies receive work orders to work on those tasks, and an appointment is scheduled if appropriate. e numbers of helpdesk suppliers, workforce providers, sub-contractors, helpdesk operators, contracts, work orders, etc., are proportional to N . 
EVALUATION
To evaluate the e ectiveness of our algorithm, we start with a ReBAC policy, generate ACLs representing the subject-permission relation, run our algorithm on the ACLs along with the class model and object model, and compare the mined ReBAC policy with the original ReBAC policy. If the mined policy is similar to the original policy, the algorithm succeeded in discovering the rules that are implicit in the ACLs.
We compare the mined policy with the original policy and with a simpli ed version of the original policy, obtained by applying simplifyRules. When the algorithm fails to produce high-level rules, the mined policy di ers from both the original and simpli ed original. When it produces high-level rules that have similar or lower WSC than the original handwri en rules, but express some aspects in a di erent high-level way, the mined policy di ers from the original but agrees with the simpli ed original. us, comparison with the simpli ed original policy is a more robust measure of the algorithm's ability to discover high-level rules.
Policy Similarity Metrics
Both of our policy similarity metrics are normalized to range from 0 (completely di erent) to 1 (identical).
Syntactic Similarity. Syntactic similarity measures the fraction of atomic conditions, atomic constraints, and actions that rules or policies have in common. e Jaccard similarity of sets is (S 1 , S 2 ) = |S 1 ∩S 2 | / |S 1 ∪S 2 |. e syntactic similarity of rules ρ 1 = st 1 , sc 1 , rt 1 , rc 1 , c 1 , A 1 and ρ 2 = st 2 , sc 2 , rt 2 , rc 2 , c 2 , A 2 is 0 if st 1 st 2 ∨ rt 1 rt 2 and is the average of (sc 1 , sc 2 ), (rc 1 , rc 2 ), (c 1 , c 2 ) and (A 1 , A 2 ) otherwise. e syntactic similarity of rule sets Rules 1 and Rules 2 is the average, over rules ρ in Rules 1 , of the syntactic similarity between ρ and the most similar rule in Rules 2 . e syntactic similarity of policies π 1 and π 2 is the maximum of the syntactic similarities of the sets of rules in the policies, considered in both orders.
Semantic Similarity. Semantic similarity measures the fraction of granted entitlements that rules or policies have in common. e semantic similarity of rules ρ 1 and ρ 2 is
. We extend this to per-rule semantic similarity of policies in exactly the same way that syntactic similarity of rules is extended to syntactic similarity of policies. Note that this metric measures similarity of the meanings of the rules in the policies, not similarity of the overall meanings of the policies. Figure 4 shows the sizes of the policies and the results of policy similarity measurements. Each data point is the average over 30 pseudo-random object models. We set all weights w i in the de nition of WSC to 1.
Policy Similarity Results
For the healthcare policy, project management policy, and university policy, the original, simpli ed original, and mined policies are identical. For the EMR policy, the original and simpli ed original policies are identical, and the mined policy has perfect per-rule semantic similarity with them and nearly perfect (0.98) average syntactic similarity with them.
e e-document case study is the most di cult for our algorithm. e algorithm does well on 37 of the 39 input rules, achieving an average syntactic similarity of 0.90 and an average semantic similarity of 0.92 with the simpli ed original policy. e mined policy's WSC is signi cantly higher than the WSC of the original policy, mostly due to the algorithm's di culty with two rules.
For the workforce management case study, the algorithm achieves an average syntactic similarity of 0.74 and an average semantic similarity of 0.93 with the simpli ed original policy. e mined policy's WSC is lower than the WSC of the original policy, although higher than the WSC of the simpli ed original policy. Figure 5 shows the running time as a function of ACL policy size |SP 0 | on an Intel i7-6700HQ CPU for both case studies and some sample policies. Each data point is the average over 10 pseudorandom object models. Error bars show 95% con dence intervals using Student's t-distribution. e running times on these policies are low-order polynomials in |SP 0 |: the slopes of the best-t lines on a log-log plot of the data are 1.4 for workforce management, 1.5 for e-document, 2.7 for project management, and 3.2 for healthcare. e results for the two case studies are encouraging indicators of the algorithm's scalability: the algorithm can mine dozens of complex rules from ACLs with several thousand entries in several minutes, and the running time grows roughly proportional to |SP 0 | × |SP 0 |.
Performance Results

RELATED WORK 6.1 Policy Models
Entity-Based Access Control (EBAC) [2] is the policy model most closely related to ours. EBAC is quite similar to ORAL, except that it is based on entity-relationship models, instead of object-oriented models, and hence lacks the concept of inheritance, which ORAL includes. EBAC's expression language includes quanti ers, and ORAL does not, although some conditions that require quanti ers in their language can be expressed in ORAL using the built-in binary relations on sets, such as ⊇.
Several ReBAC models have been proposed, by Carminati, Ferrari, and Perego [4] , Fong [9] , Cheng, Park, and Sandhu [5] , Hu, Ahn, and Jorgensen [10] , Crampton and Sellwood [6] , and others. Some are designed speci cally for OSNs, while others are designed for general use. Our model di ers from all of them because it is designed as a (nearly) minimal extension of a typical ABAC language, and the extension is achieved by adopting an object-oriented model and incorporating standard object-oriented concepts, notably path expressions, like in UML's Object Constraint Language (OCL) (h p://www.omg.org/spec/OCL/). None of these ReBAC models are based on general object-oriented data models. None of these ReBAC models can express constraints between elds (a.k.a. a ributes) of di erent entities, such as the constraint "subject.expertise ⊇ resource.expertise" in the sample rule in Section 2. In this regard, ORAL is signi cantly more expressive.
On the other hand, ORAL lacks some features found in these ReBAC models. For example, all of the languages cited above include some form of transitive closure, and ORAL does not. e languages in [2, 3, 5, 9] include some form of negation, and ORAL does not, although some conditions expressed with negation in other frameworks can be expressed in ORAL using atomic conditions of the form p, in, ∅ . e modal-logic-based policy languages in [3, 9] include formulas that specify graph pa erns, not merely paths. Many realistic applications do not require these language features, but they are useful for some applications. ese features can easily be added to our policy language. However, developing policy mining algorithms that fully exploit them may be di cult. We leave that challenge for future work. e languages in [3, 5, 6, 9] allow every relation to be traversed in reverse. ORAL, like EBAC and OCL, does not; instead, the policy designer explicitly enables reverse traversal where appropriate by including a eld in the reverse direction (this corresponds to using a bidirectional association in the UML class model).
Policy Mining
e most closely related prior work on policy mining is for ABAC policies without path expressions. Xu and Stoller developed the rst algorithms for mining ABAC policies, from a ribute data plus ACLs [15] , roles [14] , or access logs [13] . Our algorithm is based on their algorithm for mining ABAC policies from ACLs [15] . Adapting their algorithm to be suitable for ReBAC mining required many changes, most notably generalization of loops over a ributes to iterate over paths when generating conditions and constraints; speci cally, we introduce the idea of generating constraints based on shortest paths and nearly-shortest paths between classes in the graph representation of the class model. e technique for merging rules for sibling classes into a rule for an ancestor class is also new. We also modi ed the algorithm to accommodate changes in the supported relational operators: in conditions, we allow "in" and "contains", instead of "equal" and "supseteq" in [15] ; in constraints, we allow "in" in addition to "equal", "contains", and "supseteq" allowed in [15] . We also introduced several techniques to limit and prioritize the paths being considered.
